

## TO THE QUESTION OF THE SCIENTIFIC NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY

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### Abstract

The article is devoted to the actual issue of the relation of philosophy and science as independent forms of social consciousness. The purpose of this work is to give qualitative characteristics of the generality and difference of philosophy and science, to demarcate between these forms of social consciousness and to determine their interconnection within the framework of a single spiritual culture of mankind.

The article deals with the dialectics of the interaction of scientific knowledge and the philosophical interpretation of objective reality in a historical retrospective, analyzes the relationship between philosophy and science by identifying the criteria for their generality and difference. The signs of similarity imply the application of universally recognized criteria for the scientific nature of knowledge: objectivity, rationality, the pursuit of truth, the use of general scientific methods of research, connection with practical activities. At the same time, there are a number of differences, according to which philosophical knowledge is a unique phenomenon in spiritual culture.

Firstly, this is the attitude to objectivity, which is inseparable from the subject of cognition, his world outlook and the concrete personality of the philosopher. Secondly, it is a special philosophical rationality that manifests itself not only in the great philosophical systems, but also in other forms of philosophical thought: aphorisms, literary works, etc., and finally, this is the attitude to truth, which within the framework of philosophy can be accessible exclusively by the method of philosophical reflection, as well as the specific nature of the methods of cognition used by philosophy and the indirect connection with practice through science and ideology. It is against these criteria that the article demarcates the scientific and unscientific philosophy.

Science and philosophy are considered as the ratio of the part and the whole. This means that any science is philosophical, since it relies on a number of general philosophical postulates and is genetically related to it, but not every philosophy is scientific, for the criteria of the scientific nature are not fully suitable for the evaluating of philosophical knowledge. On the basis of the detailed analysis, the conclusion is made about the non-identity of philosophy and science and, at the same time, their inseparable connection, which opens up the possibility of the appearance of a qualitatively new scientific philosophy.

**Keywords:** philosophy, science, objectivity, rationality, truth, practice.

## 1 INTRODUCTION

This question in any case cannot be assessed as rhetorical. The problem of the relationship between philosophy and science, "scientific" or "unscientific" philosophy begins to be recognized since the appearance and qualitative self-determination of the latter in the "body" of spiritual culture. Already Aristotle brings to us an obvious understanding of the "isolation" of philosophy as "wisdom" as the "most important" science from other sciences, "...to which all other sciences, like slaves, do not dare to contradict" (Aristotle, 1976, p. 102). This belief, especially, in the selectiveness of philosophy, in its non-identity to the rest of both scientific and unscientific knowledge, formed in the ancient Greek spiritual culture, becomes the most important invariant component of the entire subsequent process of development of philosophical thought.

In New time, during the formation of classical science, the problem of the latter's attitude to philosophy is reflected in the works of F. Bacon, R. Descartes, and later also of G. Hegel. Thus, F. Bacon, following the Aristotelian tradition, viewed philosophy as the "mother of the rest of the sciences", as "the universal science", as "the first philosophy, or wisdom" (Bacon, 1977, p. 200).

R. Descartes on the whole not separating philosophical knowledge from the scientific one, writes that "... the whole philosophy is like a tree whose roots are metaphysics, the trunk is physics, and the branches going from this trunk are all other sciences that reduce to the three main ones: medicine, mechanics and ethics ... Just as the fruits are not collected from the roots or from the trunk of the tree, but only from the ends of its branches, so the special usefulness of philosophy depends on those parts of it that can only be studied in the end" (Descartes, 1989, p. 309). Thus, philosophy in the Cartesian interpretation is not just science, but represented by metaphysics, the genetic and substantial basis of the sciences, which determines their unity.

G. Hegel, who called philosophy the "infinite knowledge," and science the "ultimate knowledge", also pointed to the fundamental difference between philosophy and other sciences (Hegel, 1974, pp. 299-300). Without denying the fact that philosophy owes its development to other sciences, he emphasized the special position of the latter in the system of scientific knowledge. "Philosophy," wrote G. Hegel, "thus obliged to empirical sciences for its development, tells their contents the most important form of freedom of thought (a priori form) and authenticity based on the knowledge of necessity, which it puts in the place of the credibility of the facts found before and experienced ones, so that the fact could be turned into an image and an illustration of the original and completely independent activity of thinking" (Hegel, 1974, p. 98). So, if philosophy is a science, then this is a special science, a kind of "metascience" or "super-science", providing all the rest of scientific knowledge with the status of universality and necessity.

A clear understanding of philosophy as a science was the characteristic of Marxism and it was exclusively applied to the same philosophy (all other philosophical doctrines were not recognized as a science). Dialectical materialism, the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism was defined as "the science of the most general laws of motion and development of nature, society and thinking" (Philosophical Encyclopedic Dictionary, 1983, p. 159). It is funny, but the cited definition is a very free alteration of the well-known definition of dialectics given by F. Engels. "... Dialectics," he wrote, "is nothing more than a science about the universal laws of the movement and development of nature, human society and thinking" (Engels, 1977, p. 141). Let us note that philosophy and dialectics are not identical concepts, although they are compatible. One of the mysteries of the history of Marxist philosophy is what purpose the authors of the known definition made their substitution for.

## 2 OPINIONS AND DISCUSSION

So, one of the positions in solving the problem of the relationship between philosophy and science is extremely clear: philosophy is a science, even if "a special science is a science of sciences", but still a science.

N.A. Berdyaev expressed another, equally clear, but directly opposite point of view. "Philosophy," he wrote, "is in no sense a science and in no sense should be scientific ... philosophy is an independent field of culture, but not an independent field of science" (Berdyaev, 1989, p. 264).

Here are two such positions. Well, where is the truth? The truth is, as always, in the middle. Philosophy (and in this we fully agree with N.A. Berdyaev) is really not a science, it is an entirely independent phenomenon of culture, a qualitatively definite form of social consciousness, represented alongside with morality, religion, art, politics, law, science, but it can be scientific, i.e., related to science. And under no circumstances we would agree with N.A. Berdyaev in this matter, who claimed that "philosophy should be ... purely philosophical, but not scientific, just as morality should be moral, religion - religious, art - artistic" (Berdyaev,

1989, p. 264). To claim this means to deny an objective reality: the actual existence of religious, moral, aesthetic, legal or political philosophy. The forms of public consciousness are not parallel worlds. They are interrelated, they "intersect"; they are subsystems of a single, integral organic system, which name is "the spiritual culture of humanity". The relationship between philosophy and science in this system can be explained by considering the signs of their similarities and differences. The purpose of this analysis is to show how well-known scientific criteria are applicable to philosophy: objectivity, rationality, evidence, orientation to truth, practical applicability, and so on.

Let's begin our analysis with the indication of obvious signs of similarity.

1. Like scientific knowledge, philosophical knowledge claims to be objective.
2. Like scientific knowledge, philosophical knowledge can be built on the basis of rationality.
3. Like science, philosophy is aspiring to truth.
4. In the search of truth, philosophy uses general methods of cognition with science: abstraction, idealization, analysis and synthesis, deduction and induction, generalization, analogy, historical and logical methods, the method of ascent from the abstract to the concrete.
5. Like science, philosophy is connected with practice.

These are some of the most obvious signs of similarity between philosophy and science. Well, now let's look at the signs of difference.

1. Let's start with objectivity. The objectivity in science is qualitatively different from the objectivity in philosophy. Let us explain our idea. If by the objectivity of judgment to understand such of its contents or form that do not depend on a man and humanity, then such objectivity is inherent in any judgments, even those the contents of which have nothing to do with objective reality. For example, a square is a circle. This judgment does not correlate with objective reality, but its form (structure) is objective: S-P. Scientific objectivity differs from any other kind of objectivity: philosophical, artistic, mythological, etc., above all, by the fact that, not existing, like any other objectivity, without the subjective (the subject of knowledge, its activity, the result of knowledge, etc.), it depends to a minimum on the subject of cognition or its activity, or methods that are used in the cognitive process.

Werner Heisenberg spoke very clearly on this topic. "If we consider the development of science as a historical process," he wrote, "then your question revives the old problem of the role of the individual in world history. Undoubtedly, here again we will also have to admit that individuals, in fact, are largely interchangeable. If Einstein had not discovered the theory of relativity, it would sooner or later have been formulated by someone else, perhaps Poincare or Lorents. If Gunn had not discovered the splitting of uranium, then probably Fermi or Joliot would have come upon this phenomenon a little later" (Heisenberg, 1990, p. 808). In other words, in scientific cognition individuals are completely interchangeable. If it were not I. Newton who discovered the law of universal gravitation, then, of course, someone else would open it. But in philosophical knowledge, "individuals" are indispensable. Here His Majesty the Subject of Knowledge reigns, the results of which are unique. In fact, would the doctrine of the four causes have been created then but for Aristotle? Would the world have known about the absolute idea but for G. Hegel? Would someone have written "Reading about God-Manhood" but for Vladimir Soloviev? It seems that one should not explain the rhetorical nature of these questions.

Thus, philosophical objectivity, unlike the scientific one, is completely inseparable from the concrete subject of philosophical cognition. It is always connected with the personality of the philosopher, his world view, convictions and quite reasonably G. Hegel compared the history of philosophy not with the "gallery of delusions of human thought, but ... with the pantheon of divine images" (Hegel, 1974, p. 219).

2. Rationality. Without discussing the issue of scientific rationality in this article, we note the following: regardless of which ideal of rationality is accepted by the scientific community: classical, non-classical or post-non-classical, any rationality is, first of all, an appeal to the arguments of mind and reason, the maximum exclusion of emotions, passions, beliefs, personal opinions when accepting or denying cognitive results. Rationality in scientific knowledge rests on the evidence and system of knowledge and one can not imagine a science in which the rational principle would not dominate. In other words, rationality is an attribute of science, science, but not philosophy. Of course, there is a philosophical rationality, and it is somewhat like a post-non-classical type of scientific rationality. Philosophical knowledge, as well as scientific knowledge, can be characterized by systematic approach and evidence. And there were (and probably will be!) great philosophical systems, for example, by B. Spinoza, P. Holbach or G. Hegel. But in fact, along with this

philosophical knowledge, there is another one. This knowledge can be represented in the form of "Main Thoughts" of Epicurus - a kind of aphorisms of worldly wisdom. It can be "mounted" in the literary text, and this circumstance allows us to talk about the philosophy of F.M. Dostoyevsky or Leo Tolstoy, E. Remarque or Antoine De Saint-Exupéry.

And, finally, there is what is called philosophical irrationalism. This concept refers to philosophical teachings that limit or deny the role of the mind in comprehending reality. Modern irrationalism manifests itself in the philosophy of neo-Thomism, existentialism, pragmatism, personalism. Its elements are found even in positivism and neo-positivism.

So, rationality, being the "eternal companion" of scientific knowledge, is not an obligatory sign of philosophical knowledge.

3. The third sign of the difference between philosophy and science is connected with truth. Philosophy, as a science, is oriented towards truth. But, firstly, these are different ways to truth. The scientific search for truth is certainly connected with the empirical component of scientific knowledge. In other words, science "goes" to truth through observation, comparison, measurement, experiment.

You cannot imagine modern scientific theory without its initial empirical basis, which includes many fixed facts that require a theoretical explanation.

Unlike science, philosophy is able to open the "gates of truth" with the key of philosophical speculation, philosophical reflection, without any appeal to facts. But it is this path of "free mind" that gives life to philosophical anticipations of future scientific discoveries. Thus, according to W. Heisenberg "modern Physics goes along the same path as Plato and pythagoreans walked along" (Heisenberg, 1990, p. 37).

Secondly, the truth is only one of the purposes of philosophical activity. Aristotle's famous saying: "Plato is my friend, but the truth is more expensive" in fact, determined the meaning of scientific research: the truth and once again the truth! But there are other values that are different from the previous one: friendship, love, kindness, justice, the meaning of life, beauty, etc. The study of these values, their substantial comprehension goes beyond the boundaries of scientific knowledge to the field of philosophy, religion or art.

4. The next sign of the difference between philosophy and science is determined by the methods of cognition. A certain unity of the existing methodological base, however, does not allow us to ignore the obvious fact: the "arsenal" of methods of cognition used only in science is immeasurably richer than their common "arsenal" shared with the philosophy. The differentiation of modern scientific knowledge can not even be compared with the differentiation of philosophical knowledge. In medicine alone there are now more than 300 relatively independent scientific disciplines. And each discipline, in addition to the methods common to philosophy, also uses its own, special ones. Well, tell me if philosophy needs the method of nuclear magnetic resonance or if it needs the method of nodal potentials or the method for analyzing chromosome aberrations? And again these are rhetorical questions.

5. And finally, the last sign of the difference between philosophy and science, on which we have stopped, is practice. Philosophy, like science, is associated with practice, that is, the material sensory-objective activity of a person transforming natural and social objects. But this is a different connection. Modern science is connected with practice directly. In the last century it became a key factor of modern production, an important force that determines the processes of social, economic, political and spiritual development of the society. And philosophy is connected with practice indirectly: through science or through ideology.

The path of philosophy to practice through science is the way of transforming philosophical truths into scientific truths. For example, the idea of an atom was formed as a "purely" philosophical idea and, in spite of the fact that it was originally logically absurd (the whole not consisting of parts is absurd), in the XVIII century, thanks to M.V. Lomonosov, it turned into scientific for that time concepts of "element" and "corpuscle". The theory of M.V. Lomonosov was the most important foundation for physical chemistry and anticipated the principles of modern molecular-kinetic theory, but it took almost two more centuries for the philosophical idea of the atom to acquire its formidable practical meaning in the form of nuclear explosions that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Since practice is also a social transforming activity that changes social relations, it is always associated with ideology, that is with a system of views and ideas reflecting social being and determining the goals of its preservation and development. Ideology, of course, can be connected with science and at the same time fundamentally differs from it in its goals and objectives. If the second one is completely "concentrated" on the search for truth, while for the first one the value, in the best case can be not the truth itself, but our subjective attitude towards it, that is, the truth. Too many obstacles stand in the way of truth before any ideology, first of

all, in the individual or group interests. Figuratively speaking, ideology is primarily the realm of "non-gnoseological values", such as benefits, power, justice, freedom, etc. Basing on these values, any ideology is deliberately limited in its capabilities to adequate reflection of social reality and, first of all, it is an instrument of its practical transformation or preservation in accordance with the needs and interests of social subjects: personalities, social groups, etc. Well, and to solve this task of ideology philosophy helps which is represented in it as an essential backbone part. For example, one of the sources of the ideology of Marxism was, as we know, classical German philosophy, and for those who recognize this fact, the connection between G. Hegel's "logic", K. Marx's "Capital", communist ideology as a whole and the great transformations in the social and historical practice of the twentieth century is quite obvious. The theory that seized the masses became a material force (Marx and Engels, 1955, p. 422), but, of course, it could not have become such a one without the philosophical ideas of G. Hegel, I. Fihte or L. Feuerbach.

### 3 CONCLUSION

Let's sum up our reasoning. Between philosophy and science there is much in common, but there are also obvious signs of difference. The presence of these signs is the basis for the definition of philosophy as a special phenomenon of the spiritual culture of mankind, qualitatively different from science. But then there is a question about their connection, their relationship. From our point of view, this is the relation of the whole and the part where philosophy is the whole, and the science is the part that in Euler circles is illustrated as follows (Fig. 1).




Fig. 1. Relations between philosophy and science.

The proposed scheme should be understood as follows: any science is philosophical, because it is genetically and substantively connected with philosophy, but not every philosophy is scientific. In that part of the scheme where science and philosophy are the whole, what can rightfully be called "scientific philosophy" is represented: for example, the philosophy of modern natural science, technology, history, linguistics, etc. Well, and where there is "pure white field", "there are" any variants of unscientific philosophy beginning with "Timey's" dialogue by Plato and ending with the "Doctrine of Don Juan" by Carlos Constaneda.

Thus, the determination of science by philosophy does not determine their identities. Scientific criteria are not always suitable for the evaluation of philosophical knowledge. Philosophy is not a science, just like it is not morality, religion, law, politics or art. But just as the existence of philosophy in the system of forms of social consciousness generates their "hybrids": religious philosophy or the philosophy of law - there the connection of philosophy with science opens the possibility of the emergence and existence of a qualitatively new scientific philosophy.

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